Putin’s promotion of nostalgia for the Soviet Union holds undeniable implications for Russian foreign policy.Īfter decades of dominant Marxism-Leninism, the post-Soviet Russian political space offers a multiplicity of discourses associated with the contemporary state and its various organs - such as the party, the presidential administration, the bureaucracies and media - or with the different places of ideological production revealing plurality and fluidity within Russian political languages and evoking many of the neo-conservativist ideological constructs promoted by the Kremlin. This has been the case for the Ukraine, currently engaged in frozen conflict with Russian proxies, where these tools originally purposed for commemoration, have been deployed to heighten affinity for Russia and separatist ambitions amongst populations of certain Ukrainian territories. However, as observed in this thesis, these tools have not been limited to Russia’s domestic sphere, but have been used to encourage a particularly aggressive brand of Soviet nostalgia in neighboring countries. George’s ribbon and Immortal regiment, as means of promoting nostalgic sentiment. Furthermore, the Kremlin has stoked these nostalgia efforts by co-opting a number of commemorative tools, for example the St. However, studies of memory politics and political nostalgia indicate such engagement often carries with it regressive politics and forays into myth. As Russian president Vladimir Putin has tightened his authoritarian grip on the country through out his tenure, the politicization of this nostalgia has proven a worthy tool in maintaining domestic support. With the chaos and uncertainty following the downfall of the Soviet empire, a segment of the Russian population yearned for the perceived stability and international stature of the Soviet era. This paper examines the phenomenon of nostalgia for the Soviet Union in contemporary Russian society and its implications on foreign policy, through the lens of politicized nostalgia theory. Whereas propaganda associates Putin with war winners and the Soviet legacy, Ukrainian protesters are depicted as the ancestors of the defeated Nazi regime. Emphasizing the negative experience while repressing positive memories, media outlets have selectively presented historical events and facts in order to establish a negative image of the situation in modern Ukraine. The Russian media has established a strong correlation between fascist war crimes committed during World War II and the activities of protesters, thus trying to manipulate the Russian collective memory. Given the close relationship between Russia and Ukraine and Putin’s low rating at the beginning of 2013, the political changes in Ukraine could provoke a similar public response and inspire anti-Putin insurgencies. In light of the unfolding Ukrainian protests against former president Viktor Yanukovych’s rule, Putin’s government has launched a massive propaganda campaign presenting the Ukrainian political resistance as a neofascist initiative. This article analyzes the political manipulations of Vladimir Putin’s regime using the collective memory of World War II to undermine protest potential within Russian society in 2013–2015. This work therefore contributes to a better understanding of television in general and of mass media communication in Russia in particular. Thus, the study suggests that visual communication on television significantly shapes and influences the perception of the Russian president. By focusing on the visual, the analysis reveals that the president's image, and the attributes assigned to him, are established and communicated mostly via the content and arrangement of (moving) pictures. By analyzing the "new" image of Putin portrayed in this show and comparing it with his visual presentation in the news program Vremia and the annual talk Priamaia Linia s Vladimirom Putinym, the following paper examines the visual portrayal of Putin transmitted on television. This could explain why in September 2018 a new talk show called Moskva.Kreml'.Putin, which offers a synopsis of Putin's working week, began its broadcast. While the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014 initially led to an increase in the popularity of Putin, his approval rating has significantly fallen since the signing of pension reforms in autumn 2018. This image is promoted by television which still remains a powerful medium in Russia. Sharply dressed, smooth, and sporty-these are probably among the first attributes associated with the Russian president Vladimir Putin.
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